Birth certificates are the cornerstone for establishing legal identity around the world. Despite their importance, birth certificates are frequently simple, handwritten paper documents or computerized printouts, submitted with little attention to security. The birth certificate issuance process is often decentralized, potentially leading to different formats within the same country. These features make birth certificates relatively easy to forge and difficult to authenticate.
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PART I -INTRODUCTION
Birth certificates are the cornerstone for legal identity around the world. Despite their importance, birth certificates suffer from numerous shortcomings. For example, birth certificates are frequently simple, hand-written paper documents or computerized printouts submitted with very little attention to security. The birth certificate issuance process is often highly decentralized, leading to potentially different formats within the same country. These features make birth certificates relatively easy to forge and difficult to authenticate.
In many countries, applying for a passport requires the submission of a birth certificate. If the applicant has the original birth certificate, an attested copy will be submitted. In some countries, the applicant might need to visit a birth registration office and obtain a new copy of a birth certificate. If the passport office is not satisfied, it might conduct a verification by contacting the birth registration office itself. These procedures can cause delays, and at the same time may not lead to one hundred percent authentication.
A similar situation may exist in other circumstances, such as when applying for school or university admission, enrolling for healthcare or health insurance, voter's lists, driver's licenses, marriage and separation certificates, employment, income tax, banking, welfare benefits, mobile phones, utilities, and in pensions' buying and selling of assets, among others. Both public and private actors may require the submission of authentic version of an individual's birth certificate.
One way to solve this problem is to make birth certificates a highly secure document (like a banknote or passport), with the personalization and issuance completed under highly secure conditions. Some countries are considering a digital birth certificate (DBC).
In general, the birth certificate as a digital credential has become relevant in the context of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16.9, "By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration", where the birth certificate will need to be verified under extremely secure conditions for an increasing number of purposes and applications such as healthcare, voting, passport, utilities etc.
Credentials are used throughout the world and thus exist and can be obtained and managed in a diversity of forms. However, their nature often changes significantly in the digital form. An individual will no longer need to visit an office to obtain a paper copy to validate his or her credentials. Similarly, one department requiring reliable proof of birth or legal identity need not have to inspect voluminous paper records. The data from the DBC can be stored on the holder's smartphone or similar personal device to create a secure mobile form of the birth certificate. Integrating the birth certificate with innovative smartphone applications (apps) can provide impressive opportunities for online identification and authentication for e-government services or even know-yourcustomer (KYC) procedures, as well as providing more efficient interfaces where the birth certificate is most commonly used, such as accessing health / immunization services, admission to academic institutions, employment, application for passports and driver's licenses, among others.
BIRTH CERTIFICATE IN THE CONTEXT OF INCREASING DIGITIZATION
Given the increasing digitization of state records and processes as well as greater connectivity among departments, a DBC, if implemented in a secure manner, is expected to be a better choice both for timely processing and for a commensurate level of authentication.
Generally, the process of using a DBC as a source document to obtain other documents involves the following steps:
1. An individual applies for a service or identity document at a user-department. 2. Among the requirements is a check of the person's birth certificate.
3. The civil registry has comprehensive digitized birth records. 4. The user department makes a query over the network to the civil registry. 5. The civil registry sends the DBC to the user department. 6. If the user department asks only for confirmation of the individual's particulars, the civil registry sends a yes or no response. 7. The digital birth record can then be used to connect the applicant to the userdepartment, such as a healthcare system.
In addition to having the capacity and administrative processes in place to manage DBC, a country requires a corresponding legal framework to recognize a DBC.
This guidance note provides select country examples of both manual and electronic birth registration and certification processes to demonstrate the range of country arrangements from manual to full digitalization of the birth certificate. It discusses the principal requirements for moving towards DBC, with suggestions on how to meet them at the country level.
PART II -MANUAL AND ELECTRONIC BIRTH REGISTRATION AND CERTIFICATION PROCESSES
Many low-and lower-middle-income countries continue to use manually administered paper-based birth certification processes. Some countries have initiated the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) for birth registration and birth certificates, and others are well on their way to digitalization. However, even in countries that have ICT-based processes for birth registration and birth certificate generation, many steps remain to achieve full digitalization of the birth certificate or to have the birth certificate as a digital credential. Botswana, Uruguay and Peru are examples of countries that have made progress towards DBC. Some country examples are described below; they demonstrate a range of country arrangements from manual to full digitization of the birth certificate.
ETHIOPIA BIRTH CERTIFICATE -DECENTRALIZED MANUAL SYSTEM
In Ethiopia, per the civil registration law, the birth registration process is manual. 1 After birth, the mother or father applies for an original birth certificate at the civil status office of the nearest Kebele (which is the lowest administrative office in Ethiopia) where the parents reside. The civil registration law requires the civil status officer to send three copies of the registration form, within 30-45 days (depending on the level), to the higher administrative levels for storage and generation of vital statistics. Once the birth registration is completed, a birth certificate is immediately issued to the parent for a fee, manually (on paper). This is an example of a manually administered paper-based birth certification process, which is common in many countries.
BOTSWANA, URUGUAY AND PERU-LEADING TO BEST PRACTICES
Some of the best practices associated with progress towards a DBC -at least in its initial form -also consider the concept of credentials. Digital credentials are the digital equivalent of paper-based credentials, which could be a passport, a driver's license, or a birth certificate. The birth certificate as a digital credential may contain personal information such as the person's name, date and place of birth, parents' particulars, and medical particulars at birth.
The following case studies demonstrate a range of country arrangements in countries that have made significant progress on digital credentials, including Botswana (middle income), Uruguay (high income) and Peru (middle income).
BOTSWANA -ONSITE BIRTH REGISTRATION
In 2003, the Government of Botswana established an organic link between birth registration, national registration, and death registration through a unique identifier to ensure that birth registration becomes a credible foundation for identity management beyond just serving as a source of vital statistics and conferring rights on individuals. 2 To take advantage of health institutions' central role as a source of data where over 90 percent of birth and death events occur, Botswana instituted a strategy of Electronic On-Site Registration of Births and Deaths in hospitals in 2011. Assistant registrars are placed in major hospitals to register births and deaths as they occur. The doctor or midwife who attended the birth completes a birth notification form and then the assistant registrar enters the information in a birth notification form online. The mother or father is allowed to check the accuracy of the information entered electronically. A Unique Identification Number (UIN) is then generated from a central database and a birth certificate with the UIN on it is printed and given to the mother prior to discharge from the hospital. In health centers and small hospitals without an assistant registrar for onsite birth registration, a midwife or doctor completes the birth notification form and within a week forwards it to the nearest registration office where the information is entered into the central database and the UIN is generated and assigned to the birth certificate. Since the information is captured in electronic form, the parent can go to any registration office in the country to get a printed copy. Available data indicate that since its inception in 2011, electronic on-site registration has significantly improved the number of registered births and deaths and has reduced the number of late registered events. All birth certificates are issued by the service branches of the Department of Civil and National Registration (DCNR). Since 2011, the government has been issuing updated birth certificates that have enhanced security features that protect the identity of individuals 3 . Citizens are encouraged to replace their old birth certificate with the new one.
URUGUAY -BIRTH REGISTRATION AND UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
Every baby born in Uruguay is assigned a UIN generated from a central database within a few hours of birth and used for the rest of their lives. Under the computerized system, the doctor sends the certificate of live birth to the National Bureau of Civil Records via the Internet, and at that point the newborn is given the UIN, which is communicated to the hospital and to the Civil Registry to be included in the birth certificate. 4 Every infant therefore receives an identification number, birth certificate and identity card, well before leaving the hospital of birth in both the country's urban as well as rural hospitals. The Uruguayan authorities have consequently guaranteed every child the right to an identity and access to other services, such as education and health care, through that same registration.
The interconnection of civil records and citizen identification in Uruguay was supported by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). One of the biggest advantages of Uruguay's system that facilitates this interconnection is that 99 percent of all births take place at hospitals.
PERU -UNIQUE BIRTH REGISTRATION SYSTEM
Peru's current civil registration system is overseen by the autonomous institution, the National Identification and Civil Registry of Peru (Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil, RENIEC). 5 The Peruvian national identification cycle follows a process that starts at birth with the issuance of the Certificate of Live Birth, which is provided by public and private health institutions authorized by the Ministry of Health. The Certificate of Live Birth is used for obtaining the birth certificate from RENIEC, its auxiliary offices (including those in hospitals) and local civil registries.
Birth certificates include a Unique Code Identification Number (CUI) comprised of eight digits following a numeric sequential order which is also used in the central electoral list, and which becomes a person's key numeric identifier for his/her entire life cycle. In the case of local registries without Internet connectivity, RENIEC sends the registration books containing a determined number of blank birth certificates to the municipal registry offices (oficinas de registros del estado civil, OREC). Each template has a preassigned CUI that follows a sequential order. Every month, the OREC sends the record of the issued certificates back to RENIEC, where they are digitalized and stored. When the registry office has online connectivity, the CUI is assigned by the system, also in a sequential order.
ESTONIA -DIGITAL BIRTH CERTIFICATE
Registering the Newborn Child
Since July 1, 2010 Estonia, has moved to a fully electronic population register which also includes vital statistics data. All vital statistic entries are made directly to the electronic population register by the official who digitally signs the vital statistic entries inside the population register software.
The identity management of the newborn baby starts at the hospital directly following the birth of the child. The hospital orders an identification code from the population register while it drafts the medical birth certificate. The formation of the identification code itself takes only a few seconds as the hospital's register communicates directly with the population register. Together with the formation of the medical birth certificate, data about the baby are inputted in the population register. The mother's data are linked to the child's identification code. If the parents register the birth of the child, the official will only have to input the identification code of the mother to the program and the child's data will automatically appear as well since they are linked. No additional medical birth certificate is required. At that point, the population register would contain a date of birth and an identification code for the newborn child; other data such as the name, custody, and place of residence would be included after the registration of birth is completed. In case the hospital has not made an identification code for the child while drafting the medical birth certificate (e.g., in case of homebirth), the medical birth certificate must be submitted on paper and an identification code for the child would be generated and provided to the mother together with the birth registration.
Once the child's identification code is included in the population register, parents may complete their child's birth registration online using the e-service register; the e-service register can only be used if the hospital has formed an identification code for the newborn child. After submitting the online application, it is electronically transferred to the official who checks the data in the application and registers the child's birth. A notice will then be sent to the parents or can be picked up by the parents at the vital statistics office.
A birth certificate is digitally signed by an official and can be issued electronically. When a person needs to communicate with authorities who perform public duties, no additional paper birth certificate is required. There is still a possibility to get a birth certificate on paper. It is usually needed if one or both of the parents need to present it to an employer or to a foreign country's authority. Birth certificates may be printed directly from the population register.
Finally, when parents want to apply for an identification card for their child, they only need to go to the Police and Border Guard Board and present their own identification cards and the official may access the child's data from the population register since it is linked to their data. After the child's identification card has been issued, the data about the identification card will be linked to the child in the population register.
Uses of and Access to the Digital Birth Certificate
Since July 1, 2010 Estonia waived the use of paper-based documents and all data were inputted to the population register electronically. A new provision was set, stating that data entered in the population register have legal effect, such that authorities who perform public duties rely on the data entered in the population register and do not request submission of a certificate or an extract of the population register. Initial collection of primary data in the population register in other databases is prohibited. This principle was also set by law.
Other authorities who perform public duties such as local governments, healthcare institutions, the Police and Border Guard Board, the Tax and Customs Board, the Social Insurance Board, among others, must rely on the data entered in the population register.
In order to do so, they have direct access to the population register (e.g., vital statistic officials in local governments) or they have access to the population register via X-Roada system that ensures secure and direct data exchange between its members. The population register is connected to other systems via X-Road, and a variety of other state systems depend on its data for their services. For example, when individuals apply for child support, a study allowance or a concession status for public transport, data are retrieved from the Population Register. The system retrieves the information automatically -no extra documents have to be submitted or online forms filled out.
This system makes it more difficult for fraudulent papers to be used because data are kept in an electronical registry linked to a specific identification number, making the identity management more secure. The possibility of identity theft is less likely because a person does not have the possibility to present paper breeder documents.
Moving to a fully electronic register also brought up the necessity to digitalize vital records made before July 2010; all vital statistic events documented on paper from 1 st of July 2010 back to 1 st of July 1926 will be digitalized and the data transferred to the population register without the need for individuals to present additional documentation. Together with the data, pictures of the vital statistics entry on paper (e.g., pictures of the birth certificates) are being added to the population register.
The Ministry of the Interior exercises the rights of the chief processor of the population register and supervises how the register's data are used.
Future Innovations
The majority of people who have provided feedback have welcomed the electronic population register explaining that it is easier, faster and more comfortable to use, and avoids the need to go between different authorities to complete registration.
In the next year, the Government of Estonia is planning to launch a new portal which will contain more user-friendly e-services. Some features that will be added include an extension of the user circle for the birth registration and the launching of the "e-death" project. For the birth registration, at the moment only married people can register their child's birth via e-service. In the future, acknowledgement of paternity will also be done using the e-service and single mothers would be able to use the e-service. In the next year, the government plans to launch the so-called "e-death" project, in which a person does not have to submit an application in person to register a death; the healthcare provider would be able to forward the information about the death to the population register electronically, upon preparing a medical death statement in the database. The possibility to register death at a vital statistics department would remain for exceptional cases.
The government is planning to continuously develop its e-services and population registration program in order to make it more user-friendly for both the officials and the people.
PART III -TYPES OF DIGTAL CREDENTIALS AND TECHNIQUES TO INFORM BIRTH CERTIFICATES
Moving towards a fully DBC requires appropriate ICT infrastructure, among other things, and can be explored with a study of other identity documents available in a country, such as electronic passports (e-passports) and driver's licenses that may undergo transformation from paper to digital forms prior to the birth certificate. Intermediate forms of such documents include chip-based e-documents as well as mobile phone-based versions. In addition to requiring the appropriate ICT infrastructure, DBCs involve techniques such as encryption and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). DBCs also require the implementation and understanding of laws pertaining to digital credentials, as well as standardization of efforts; one such effort includes the European Union initiative on breeder documents under the aegis of the European committee on standardization of breeder documents, CEN/TC224 WG19. Issues associated with credentialing are also discussed below. In this context, a breeder document is defined broadly as a document that can be used as a basis to obtain other identification documents.
The below presentation of digital credentials elucidates some of the experience and requirements for digital credentials in general, including for DBC, for which there is more limited experience.
E-PASSPORTS AND THE DIGITAL TRAVEL CREDENTIAL (DTC)
Machine 
DTC -Australian model
In 2015, an "Ideas Challenge" 2 led by Australia's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade resulted in the first major development of the DTC, an initiative that has since generated much interest around the globe. It has since been actively supported not only by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), but also organizations such as International Air Transport Association (IATA), the World Customs Organization (WCO) and WEF.
The initiative aims to store information from Australian passports in the cloud alongside biometric identifiers and grant Australian citizens the opportunity for document-free travel between Australia and regular destinations such as Singapore and New Zealand.
As is currently envisioned, the DTC will be a copy of the MRTD, which will continue to be the original document. However, the digital form lends itself to much more versatile usage.
Losing your Passport while Traveling
One of the benefits of a DTC is convenient retrieval. For example, if an individual loses his or her passport, that person's consulate or embassy could retrieve and activate a digital copy from the government passport agency's servers onto the holder's mobile phone. Data in the mobile phone are signed using the same certificate as the data stored in the microprocessor of the lost passport booklet, providing a much greater level of security than most emergency travel documents, as these may comprise a piece of paper with some basic security features, manually issued in a consulate.
Applying for a Visa
Similarly, DTCs may offer an efficient means by which to apply for a visa. Typically, individuals must visit a consulate to apply for a visa since they must physically present their passport for the visa to be issued in the visa pages of the booklet. With digital travel credentials, passport data could be transferred directly between an applicant's passport issuing authority and the visa office.
This expedites the process for both the visa office and the applicant while allowing for a higher level of confidence in the data provided. With the next version of the e-passport specifications, it will be possible for the applicant to securely download the visa from the visa office using a mobile device for a faster check at the point of entry in the country. This can also be useful for pre-travel authorization, since it increases the level of confidence in the data provided by the applicant.
In June 2016, the ICAO New Technologies Working Group created a new sub-group on DTC. The ongoing work done on next generation e-passports, where visas (ICAO Doc9303 part 7) and entry/exit stamps will optionally be stored in the e-passport's microprocessor, is being closely coordinated with this sub-group, given the natural convergence between the topics. This will further converge with the newly implemented Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger Name Record (PNR) systems.
While this example has more diverse and cross-border uses, lessons can especially be drawn about implementing a digital birth credential.
THE DIGITAL DRIVER'S LICENSE
The digital driver's license provides another example of global uptake of digitized identity documents. ICT makes it increasingly easy to conduct identity-related transactions via mobile phone, from making payments, collecting or redeeming loyalty points to checkingin on airlines. The smartphone can also be used as a convenient way to identify and authenticate one's identity and provides the ideal platform for digitalization of a driver's license.
The primary goals of the driver's license, whether physical or mobile, remains to confirm the identity of the driver and confer upon its holder the right to drive a vehicle. The digital driver's license is already being trialed in various countries, and standards for digital driver's licenses are under preparation 3 .
Figure 2: Examples of Card based driver's license and mobile driver's license
Driving Technology Innovations
The connection of a digital driver's license to the owner's car is a popular topic for both the automotive industry and for consumers. As the Internet of Things technology progresses, car manufacturers and technology companies are striving to find new ways to ensure driver and passenger safety. In this context, the digital driver's license could help improve road safety and reduce fraud. Having a digital license available on a mobile device, for example, would be a natural progression, bringing with it more benefits and opportunities for issuers, regulatory authorities as well as drivers.
Replacing the Traditional Driver's License
A digital driver's license is in one sense an on-screen version of the traditional license, but it has the potential to be used differently since it can now work in other ways. For example, a digital license can be remotely inspected and checked; it cannot be lost; and any readand-write operation associated with the license can be reliably logged.
Various options are currently being implemented. Typically, at a license holder's request, the issuer pairs the applicant's phone and profile on a backend system. The user then downloads the mobile license through a secure mobile application. The data are encrypted and securely retrieved. The license's digital format comes with additional security features to combat counterfeiting and real-time authentication for better control against identity fraud.
In addition to the important security features, issuing authorities have shown interest in the mobile format for a digital driver's license for user convenience for the following reasons, among others:
• Holders can travel lighter with a digital driver's license, which can be easily updated on phones or mobile devices • Holders can amend their personal information or even renew their mobile driver's license directly through an application instead of visiting an office or calling a number, saving time and resources • Law enforcement or other parties can quickly verify identity and privileges • Issuing authorities can explore new services requiring a trusted and secure channel • Authorities will have much greater control over in-use credentials compared to a traditional physical license; for example, alerting holders when their license is about to expire
The driver's license has been a standard for decades, acting not just as proof of ability to drive, but also as identification to verify age and identity. Therefore, mobile, digitalized driving licenses could potentially enhance:
• Police controls: roadside stops to identify the driver of a vehicle and his/her privileges • Proof of age: where purchase of alcohol or cigarettes is required • Car rental: to identify the renter, ensure driving privileges and quickly share personal details • Identity validation or confirmation for hotel check-in, financial institutions, social services • Online authentication: from access control to identity verification There are some technical and regulatory issues that need to be clarified before licenses become fully digital. Regulators need to determine whether digitalization is worth the investment and whether a digital license should complement or replace the traditional license. Work on digital driver's license standards is currently in progress.
Although some steps are required before the digital driver's license could complement or replace the traditional license, many countries including Australia, India and some European states are exploring the option.
ENCRYPTION
Encryption plays an important role in the secure storage and handling of digital credentials. The sections below describe the properties and systems that are required for implementation.
Encryption is the process of encoding a message or information in such a way that only authorized parties can access it and those who are not authorized cannot. Encryption has long been used by military and governments to facilitate communication. It is now commonly used in protecting information within many kinds of civilian systems. 6 Encryption does not prevent interference but denies the intelligible content to a would-be interceptor. In an encryption scheme, the intended information or message, referred to as plaintext, is encrypted using an encryption algorithm -a cipher; generating ciphertext that can be read only if decrypted.
For technical reasons, an encryption scheme usually uses a pseudo-random encryption key generated by an algorithm. It is in principle possible to decrypt the message without possessing the key, but a well-designed encryption scheme requires considerable computational resources and skills. An authorized recipient can easily decrypt the message with the key provided by the originator to recipients but not to unauthorized users. 7
Symmetric Key Encryption (DES)
In symmetric key schemes, the encryption and decryption keys are the same. Communicating parties must have the same key to achieve secure communication, which was the principle behind the establishment of Symmetric Key Encryption (Data Encryption Standard [DES]) and 3-DES encryption.
Public and Private Key Encryption (RSA and ECC)
In recent years, the majority of secure systems use public key encryption, whereby the encryption key is published for anyone to use and encrypt messages. However, only the receiving party has access to the decryption key that enables messages to be read. Public key encryption has been in use since the mid-1970s. Two systems in widespread use are the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), which is named after its inventors, and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). ECC provides much stronger encryption with shorter keys (256 bits ECC = 3072 bits RSA), and is thus preferred.
Uses of Encryption
Encryption can be used to protect data "at rest," such as information stored on computers and storage devices (e.g., USB flash drives and detachable hard drives). In recent years, there have been numerous reports of confidential data, such as customers' personal records, being exposed through loss or theft of laptop computers or backup drives; encrypting such files at rest helps protect them if physical security measures fail. Digital rights management systems, which prevent unauthorized use or reproduction of copyrighted material and protect software against reverse engineering (see also copy protection), are another example of using encryption on data at rest.
Types of Attacks
Cyber-adversaries have developed new types of attacks to the encryption of data at rest. These more recent threats to encryption of data at rest include cryptographic attacks, stolen ciphertext attacks, attacks on encryption keys, insider attacks, data corruption or integrity attacks, data destruction attacks, and ransomware attacks. Data fragmentation and active defense data protection technologies attempt to counter some of these attacks by distributing, moving, or mutating ciphertext so it is more difficult to identify, steal, corrupt, or destroy.
Encryption is also used to protect data in transit, for example data being transferred via networks (e.g., the Internet, e-commerce), mobile telephones, wireless microphones, wireless intercom systems, Bluetooth devices and bank automatic teller machines. There have been numerous reports of data in transit being intercepted in recent years. Data should also be encrypted when transmitted across networks to protect against eavesdropping of network traffic by unauthorized users.
Message Verification
Encryption itself can protect the confidentiality of messages, but other techniques are needed to protect the integrity and authenticity of a message, such as the verification of a message authentication code (MAC) or a digital signature. Standards for cryptographic software and hardware to perform encryption are widely available, but successfully using encryption to ensure security may be a challenge. A single error in system design or execution can allow successful attacks. Sometimes, an adversary can obtain unencrypted information without directly undoing the encryption.
Digital signature and encryption must be applied to ciphertext when it is created (typically on the same device used to compose the message) to avoid tampering; otherwise any node between the sender and the encryption agent could potentially tamper with it. Encrypting at the time of creation is only secure if the encryption device itself has not been tampered.
Data Erasure
Conventional methods for deleting data permanently from a storage device involve overwriting whole content with zeros, ones or other patterns -a process that can take a significant amount of time, depending on the capacity and the type of the medium. Cryptography also offers ways of making the erasure almost instantaneous. This method is called crypto-shredding.
PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE (PKI)
A PKI is needed to ensure that the digital credential is stored, transmitted and read in the most secure manner. PKI is a set of roles, policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates and manage public-key encryption. PKI creates digital certificates mapping public keys to entities, and securely stores these certificates in a central repository and revokes them if needed.
Figure 3 : PKI Characteristics
A PKI typically consists of: 1. A certificate authority that stores, issues and signs the digital certificates.
A registration authority that verifies the identity of entities requesting their
digital certificates to be stored at the CA.
3.
A central directory-i.e., a secure location in which to store and index keys. 4. A certificate management system managing things such as access to stored certificates or the delivery of the certificates to be issued.
A certificate policy stating the PKI's requirements concerning its procedures.
Its purpose is to allow outsiders to analyze the PKI's trustworthiness.
The purpose of a PKI is to facilitate the secure electronic transfer of information for a range of network activities such as e-commerce, internet banking and confidential email. It is required for activities where simple passwords are inadequate methods of authentication, and more rigorous proof is required to confirm the identity of the parties involved in the communication and to validate the information being transferred.
In cryptography, PKI is an arrangement that binds public keys with identities of entities (people and organizations). 8 The binding is established through a process of registration and issuance of certificates at and by a certificate authority (CA). Depending on the assurance level of the binding, this may be carried out by an automated process or under human supervision.
Figure 4: Building PKI
Blockchain-Based PKI
An emerging approach for PKI is to use the blockchain technology commonly associated with modern cryptocurrency. Since blockchain technology aims to provide a distributed and unalterable ledger of information, it has qualities considered suitable for the storage and management of public keys. 9
While blockchain technology can approximate the proof of work often underpinning users' confidence in a PKI, it does not conclusively address issues such as administrative conformance to policy, operational security and software implementation quality.
These issues are associated with any certificate authority paradigm regardless of the underlying cryptographic methods and algorithms employed. A PKI that seeks to endow certificates with trustworthy properties is also expected to address these issues.
Current blockchain technology has its own restrictions, such as a low throughput, that cause potentially long response times and high transaction fees.
LAWS PERTAINING TO DIGITAL CREDENTIALS
Laws pertaining to digital credentials are often linked to encryption and PKI. Laws usually have little or nothing to say on the merits of particular security technologies, but instead tend to bestow broad equivalence on documents, whether in electronic or paper form. Technology neutrality puts the onus on users, system architects and service providers to select authentication technology on a risk-managed basis, agreeing on what is fit for purpose.
In 1996, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) developed a Model Electronic Commerce Law which in general suffices for non-financial government transactions and would thus be appropriate for the creation, storage and secure sharing of digital birth credentials.
In 2014, the European Commission introduced the electronic identification, authentication and trust services (eIDAS) regulation, which originally aimed at e-commerce transactions across borders of European Union (EU) member countries. However, the same regulation also could be used for the secure, reliable and trusted management of DBCs. Both the UNCITRAL model law and eIDAS share several basic principles.
UNCITRAL and eIDAS are generally recognized as technology-neutral legislation around the world. Some analysts critique the lack of legal certainty under these types of laws, although contract law in most jurisdictions allows for 'scheme rules' to adequately manage e-commerce risks without the need for overarching e-signature sanctions. This is not envisaged in the case of the digital birth credential. The technology-neutral UNCITRAL definition of "electronic signature" is: "data in electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated with, a data message, which may be used to identify the signatory in relation to the data message and to indicate the signatory's approval of the information contained in the data message". 10 Similarly, the eIDAS regulation 11 establishes a new legal structure for electronic identification, signatures, seals and documents throughout the EU. EU regulation N°910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation) was adopted by the Council of the European Union on July 23, 2014. Prescriptive legislation seeks to somehow constrain the types of signature technologies that are acceptable. These types of laws can go so far as to deny legal rights to electronic transactions unless they are secured using an approved technology, which is typically a government-licensed PKI. There can be legal sanctions against operating unlicensed certificate authorities in these places. Examples of such places include Malaysia, Italy, South Korea, India, and the U.S. state of Utah. Critics say prescriptive legislation can stifle innovation and restrict free trade.
UNCITRA Model Law
Key Disclosure
An important point of caution is that since digital credentials will be encrypted at all times, there might be exigencies and exceptional cases when decryption might be required for legal reasons, or due to the malfeasance of rogue employees, third parties or even hackers. For such exigencies, legal provisions are often required for key disclosure.
Mandatory key disclosure is legislation that requires individuals to surrender cryptographic keys to law enforcement to allow access to material for confiscation as well as digital forensics; it can be used either as evidence in a court of law or to enforce national security interests. Similarly, mandatory decryption laws obligate parties holding encrypted data to supply decrypted data to law enforcement.
Nations follow diverse practices in the implementation of key disclosure laws. For example, Australia gives law enforcement wide-ranging power to compel assistance in decrypting data from any party. Due to concerns about self-incrimination, some governments, such as Belgium, only allow law enforcement to compel assistance from non-suspects. Other governments require only specific third parties, such as telecommunications carriers, certification providers, or maintainers of encryption services, to assist with decryption. In all cases, a warrant is generally required.
Theory and Countermeasures
Mandatory decryption is technically a weaker requirement than key disclosure, since it is possible in some cryptosystems to prove that a message has been decrypted correctly without revealing the key. For example, using RSA public-key encryption, given the message (plaintext), the encrypted message (ciphertext), and the public key of the recipient, one can verify that the message is correct by merely re-encrypting it and comparing the result to the encrypted message. Such a scheme is called undeniable, since once the government has validated the message they cannot deny that it is the correct decrypted message.
A problematic aspect of key disclosure is that it leads to a total compromise of all data encrypted using that key in the past or future. To counter this, time-limited encryption schemes are proposed that allow decryption only for a limited time-period.
Violation of Privacy
Critics of key disclosure laws often view them as compromising information privacy by requiring revealing personal information that may not be pertinent to the crime under investigation, as well as violating the right against self-incrimination and more generally the right to silence in states that respect these rights.
In some cases, it may be impossible to decrypt the data because the key has been lost, forgotten or revoked, or because the data are actually random data which cannot be effectively distinguished from encrypted data.
A proactive alternative to key disclosure law is key escrow law, whereby the government holds in escrow a copy of all cryptographic keys in use but is permitted to use them only if an appropriate warrant is issued. Key escrow systems face difficult technical issues and are subject to many of the same criticisms as key disclosure law; they avoid some issues such as lost keys, but introduce new issues, such as the risk of accidental disclosure of large numbers of keys, theft of the keys by hackers, or abuse of power by government employees with access to the keys.
eIDAS Architecture
The eIDAS architecture can best be described by the diagram below, which is already adapted for e-health services and can be easily extended to DBCs.
Figure 5: The eIDAS Architecture
It may be noted that the UNCITRAL model law provides a good example of how the legal framework can be set up within a country and eIDAS for an inter-country framework.
BREEDER DOCUMENT STANDARDS CEN/TC224 WG19 4
The European initiative, CEN/TC224/WG19, is the first standards initiative for breeder documents, defined in this context as a document that can be used as a basis to obtain other identification documents. The initiative considers of all variations of digital breeder documents. The kick-off meeting of the standards group in early 2017 announced the mandate for the creation of a Working Group dedicated to breeder documents as follows:
CEN/TC 224 approves the creation of a Working Group dedicated to the standardization of Breeder Documents and invites AFNOR [French national organization for standardization, Association française de normalisation] to start the process of the creation of the group, considering the importance of the topic for European standardization, by the end of January 2017 12 .
Its terms of reference also state that: CEN/TC224/WG19 is leading European specific standardization activities in the field of breeder documents. It includes, but is not restricted to; the data collection, the application and the issuing and future renew process.
The initial meetings have highlighted that the standards will address personal identification in conjunction with personal devices, with secure elements, systems, operations and privacy in a multi-sectoral environment. The scope is expected to cover, among others:
• Operations, such as applications and services including electronic identification, electronic signature, payment and charging, access and border control • Personal devices with secure elements independently of their form factor, such as cards, mobile devices, and their related interfaces • Security services including authentication, confidentiality, integrity, biometrics, protection of personal and sensitive data • System components such as accepting devices, servers, cryptographic modules A table below outlines the structure of the information being created under CEN/TC224-WG19. At least seven countries have already endorsed the standard preparation and the body is represented by several experts drawn from various countries, both from the government as well as the industry. 13 Please note that this structure is work-in-progress and will be subject to change. It should be possible to refer to the CEN/TC224 WG19 discussions and information from time to time as these become available in the public domain.
PART IV -THE WAY FORWARD
Once systems, standards and relevant legislation are in place to issue digital birth certificates, the process of certification would involve the following steps and features:
1. The proposed system will work on the principal of data, encryption and digital signatures, to ensure secure storage and transmission, only after foolproof identification of sender and receiver.
2. Many countries already have a PKI that is being used for electronic commerce, electronic passports, and other uses. Most countries also have a designated Certification Authority that can also be used to verify the DBC; otherwise they much establish a PKI and assign a relevant a Certification Authority.
3. An Application Program Interface can be provided to the user departments and organizations, which can then establish application software that can query the DBC database, and securely receive a response. This could consist of either an entire data image, partial data or in some cases, a simple 'yes' or 'no' response.
4. Typical user departments and organizations include the following: public healthcare services; educational institutions; driver's license and passport issuing authorities; employers; and financial institutions such as banks. However, it is up to individual governments to decide on the usage of such a system.
5.
Using a private key, it should be possible for individual citizens to download their DBC to a mobile phone or tablet. This can provide another mode of secure information exchange, that is a citizen displays her data on a mobile phone to a user department.
6. The cost will depend on the availability of existing infrastructure (premises, hardware, and software) and cloud-based services; population size and geography of the country; number of centers etc. There will also be a cost for the one-time digitization of existing paper birth certificates, or even those that exist in computer media but that need to be standardized, encrypted etc.
7. The proposed system will use existing technological modes for a new application. In general, it should be possible to train existing human resources for this purpose. 
